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HIS Article surveys the significant developments of the past year in
Texas law concerning the exploration for and development of min-
eral resources.I Mineral resources, for the purposes of the Article,
include both deposits of hydrocarbons, such as oil and gas, and deposits of
hard minerals. The scope of this Article is limited to decisions by Texas
and federal courts and to rules and regulations promulgated by Texas ad-
ministrative agencies. This Article includes no coverage of the taxation or
federal regulation of mineral resources, nor does the Article cover develop-
ments in international energy law.
This Article is divided into four sections. The first part of the Article
discusses the recent developments in the case law of the mineral estate.
The second part focuses on the principal cases decided during the survey
period pertaining to the mineral lease. The third part draws attention to
an important case dealing with deemed notice of unrecorded mineral doc-
uments. The final part summarizes recent administrative developments.
I. THE MINERAL ESTATE
A. Surface Deposits of Minerals
The decision in Martin v. Schneider2 divided the courts of appeals on the
application of the Texas Supreme Court's surface destruction test to roy-
alty interests. The surface destruction test provides that a conveyance of
the mineral estate does not transfer a mineral if, at the time a dispute
arises, the mineral could be exploited by any reasonable method that
would destroy the surface of the land.3 The Austin court of appeals in
*A.B., J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Kilgore & Kilgore, Dallas, Texas.
I. The law of mineral resources has historically focused on the exploration for and
production of minerals and hydrocarbons. Traditionally, the law of mineral resources has
not included the transportation, processing, and marketing of minerals and hydrocarbons,
nor the organization and financing of the enterprises conducting these activities. This Arti-
cle preserves the traditional focus on the activities of exploration and production. The
reader interested in completing the survey of current developments in the law governing all
aspects of the exploitation of mineral resources in our society may wish to supplement his
reading with treatments of current developments in public utilities law, environmental law,
commercial law, and the law of business associations.
2. 622 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
3. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980). This decision reexamined and
refined the interpretation of the surface destruction test offered in Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d
169, 172 (Tex. 1977).
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DuBois v. Jacobs4 had held that an earlier version of the surface destruc-
tion test applied to conveyances and reservations of any interest in miner-
als, including royalty interests.5 Thus, a grantor's reservation of a royalty
in oil, gas, and other minerals would not reserve to the grantor a royalty in
a mineral occurring as a surface deposit. 6 The Corpus Christi court of
appeals has diverged from the course set by the Austin court and has held
that the surface destruction test applies only to ownership interests in min-
erals and not to royalty interests?7 In Martin the defendants conveyed a
tract of land to the plaintiffs and reserved for themselves a royalty interest
in oil, gas, other hydrocarbons, and other minerals. Uranium was later
discovered on the property and, at the time the plaintiffs brought suit, was
being both strip mined and mined by solution. The defendants claimed a
royalty from the uranium produced. The court held that the royalty inter-
est reserved by the defendants applied not only to the mineral estate, but to
minerals occurring in surface deposits as well. 8
In reaching its conclusion, the Corpus Christi court of appeals distin-
guished Martin from DuBois by the fact that the Austin court decided Du-
Bois before the supreme court handed down its decisions in Reed Y.
Wylie. 9 The Corpus Christi court reasoned that the Reed decisions ex-
pressed the high court's intention to limit the application of the surface
destruction test to questions of ownership of minerals in place and not to
apply the surface destruction test to royalty interests.' 0 In support of its
contention the Martin court cited two aspects of the Reed decisions. First,
the Martin court pointed out that the conveyance in the Reed cases trans-
ferred only mineral interests and were written in terms of ownership."
Secondly, the appeals court stated that the high court based its develop-
ment of the surface destruction test in Reed on the intentions of a land-
owner who had conveyed only his mineral estate to another and had
retained the surface estate.' 2 In Acker Y. Guinn 13 the supreme court wrote
that such a landowner would never have intended to convey'minerals oc-
curring as surface deposits, because such a conveyance would result in the
destruction of the land's surface and the termination of the landowner's
4. 551 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
5. Id. at 150. The earlier version of the test provided that "a grant or reservation of
'minerals' or 'mineral rights' should not be construed to include a substance that must be
removed by methods that will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface estate." Acker v.
Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
6. See DuBois, 551 S.W.2d at 150.
7. Martin, 622 S.W.2d at 622. The court based its holding on the distinction between
ownership interests and royalty interests. "[T]he owner of a mere royalty interest has no
present or prospective possessory interest in the land; . . . his interest is merely a present
vested incorporeal interest in the land." Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV.
569, 569-70 (1948) (footnote omitted).
8. 622 S.W.2d at 622.
9. Id
10. Id.
I1. Id. at 621-22.
12. Id at 621.
13. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
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use of his retained estate.14 The Martin court reasoned that the same con-
cern for the surface estate was not present when a landowner conveyed
both surface and mineral estates to another and retained only a royalty
interest in whatever minerals were later discovered and produced.' 5 The
court also reasoned that a grantor who had retained only a royalty interest,
as contrasted with a mineral interest, has no right to enter the surface es-
tate and begin drilling or mining operations. 16
The Martin court's discussion of the underlying purpose of the surface
destruction test is subject to criticism. Although the Texas Supreme Court
initially considered the general intentions of a typical landowner when for-
mulating the first version of the surface destruction test, 17 the court was
also concerned with developing a general test that could be applied with
reasonable certainty without resorting to case-by-case determinations of
intentions and geology. The present form of the surface destruction test
ignores the intentions of a landowner at the time of the conveyance. The
test now refers to mining techniques in use at the time of litigation rather
than at the time of the conveyance. 18 The Martin court needs to show that
the creation of a special qualification of the surface destruction test for
royalty interests can be justified on grounds stronger than the citation of a
minor line of reasoning behind the general test itself. The divergence of
opinion between the Austin court of appeals and the Corpus Christi court
of appeals gives the Texas Supreme Court an opportunity to settle the
dispute.
B. The Scope of Executive Rights
Brown v. Getty Reserve Oil, Inc. 19 clarified the scope of executive rights
with respect to pooling and unitization.20 The holder of the executive right
to lease a given tract of land subject to a royalty interest cannot, without
the consent of the royalty owner, agree through a lease provision to the
pooling or unitization of the tract of land.21 The executive is permitted,
however, to communitize the tract by executing a lease that covers not only
the first tract of land, but also covers other acreage owned by the execu-
14. Id at 352. For this proposition the court cited Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and
Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112 (1949).
15. 622 S.W.2d at 621.
16. Id at 621-22.
17. See Acker, 464 S.W.2d at 352.
18. See Reed, 597 S.W.2d at 747.
19. 626 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
20. A second significant case concerning executive rights, Manges v. Guerra, 621
S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ granted), was decided during the survey pe-
riod. The Texas Supreme Court has granted an application for writ of error in this case, 25
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 384 (June 16, 1982). Because the supreme court's decision may be delivered
before the publication date for this Article, this commentator prefers to delay any analysis of
the case until the next survey period.
21. 626 S.W.2d at 814; see Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 430, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (1943).
See generally 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 339.3[7] (1981) (discussion
of Brown Y. Smith).
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tive.22 The Getty case eliminated the apparent anomaly23 between the ef-
fect of a community lease and a pooling clause at least as to nonexecutive
royalty owners. The appeals court in Getty held that a community lease
will not pool the acreage subject to the lease for purposes of determining
shares of income due to nonexecutive royalty owners unless the nonexecu-
tive royalty owners ratify the lease.24 A community lease will, neverthe-
less, continue to pool its acreage for purposes of holding all acreage
beyond the conclusion of the lease's primary term.25 Thus, neither a com-
munity lease nor a lease pooling clause will pool nonexecutive royalty in-
come without the royalty owners' consent.
The holder of the executive right to lease in Getty executed a lease cov-
ering two tracts of land. Each tract of land was subject to a one-sixteenth
nonexecutive royalty interest. The lessee failed to obtain consent to the
community lease from any of the owners of the nonexecutive royalty inter-
ests prior to its drilling operations. The lessee drilled a producing well on
one of the tracts and then attempted to obtain the consent of the nonexecu-
tive royalty owners to the community lease, which contained an entirety
clause. 26 The entirety clause, if it had been effective against the nonexecu-
tive royalty owners, would have pooled the two one-sixteenth nonexecu-
tive royalty interests, and the owners of each nonexecutive royalty interest
would have received income based on a one-thirty-second royalty. The
owners of the royalty interest encumbering the nonproducing acreage rati-
fied the community lease, thus qualifying for a one-thirty-second share of
the income from the producing acreage. Most of the owners of the nonex-
ecutive royalty interest on the producing tract of land refused, however, to
ratify the lease. These royalty owners had the opportunity to wait for the
proving of their acreage before deciding whether to consent to a pooling of
their interests, because the lessee had failed to seek their consent prior to
drilling. The Amarillo court of appeals held that the nonconsenting own-
ers of the nonexecutive royalty interest encumbering the producing acre-
age were entitled to a full one-sixteenth of the production from the well
located on their acreage. 27 By failing to obtain the consent of all interest
owners to the lease prior to drilling, the lessee increased his royalty obliga-
tion to the nonexecutive royalty owners.
22. 626 S.W.2d at 814; see Mathews v. Sun Oil Co., 425 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. 1968).
See generally 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 21, § 339.3[7] (discussion of Mathews
v. Sun Oil Co.).
23. For a discussion of the executive's power to communitize tracts of land, see 2 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 21, § 339.3[7]. Williams and Meyers explain the appar-
ent anomaly as a by-product of limiting the decision in Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174
S.W.2d 43 (1943), and argue that the case should be overruled. 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEY-
ERS, supra note 21, § 339.3[7J.
24. 626 S.W.2d at 814; see Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex.
1968) (pooling not binding absent consent).
25. 626 S.W.2d at 814.
26. For a general introduction to entirety clauses, see 4 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 48.2 (1972); 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 2, § 521.3.
27. 626 S.W.2d at 815.
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II. THE MINERAL LEASE
A4. The Royally Clause
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas contrib-
uted to the growing case law on royalties from natural gas sold on the
interstate market with its decision in Bowers v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 28
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Texas Supreme Court have held that a land-
owner's fair market value royalties from natural gas sold on the regulated
interstate market are to be computed with reference to the various federal
price ceilings on interstate gas.29 Such computations are not to reflect the
prices paid for natural gas sold on the intrastate market.30
The Texas Supreme Court laid a foundation for the case law dealing
with interstate fair market value royalties with its decision in Exxon Corp.
v. Middleton.31 Although the case concerned fair market value royalties
for natural gas produced and sold within the state of Texas, the Middleton
opinion contained the following language that formed the basis of the
supreme court's decision on interstate royalties in First National Bank v.
Exxon Corp. :32
Market value may be calculated by using comparable sales.
Comparable sales of gas are those comparable in time, quality, quan-
tity, and availability of marketing outlets ...
* * * Quality also involves the legal characteristics of the gas; that is,
whether it is sold in a regulated or unregulated market, or in one par-
ticular category of a regulated market.33
The Middleton court also wrote that "[t]o determine the market value of
gas, the gas should be valued as though it is free and available for sale."'34
These two extracts from the Middleton decision figured prominently in the
Bowers opinion. The plaintiffs in Bowers argued that in order to calculate
their royalties, the fair market value of the natural gas sold in the interstate
market should be determined with reference to the federally stipulated
price for gas subject to "rollover" or "replacement" contracts. Implicit in
the plaintiffs' contention was the idea that gas sold in the interstate market,
if it was to be considered "free and available for sale," should be viewed as
no longer subject to a gas sales contract and thus subject to a different
category of federally mandated price controls.
The trial court, as one of its conclusions of law, rejected the plaintiffs'
contention and ruled that the plaintiffs' fair market value royalties were to
28. 526 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
29. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1264, 1265 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g
denied, 654 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Exxon Corp., 622 S.W.2d 80, 81-82
(Tex. 1981).
30. First Nat'l Bank v. Exxon Corp., 622 S.W.2d 80, 81-82 (Tex. 1981). Fair market
value for royalty computation is calculated by using "comparable sales of gas." Exxon
Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981). Intrastate sales of gas and interstate
sales of gas are not comparable. Id
31. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
32. See First Nat'l Bank v. Exxon Corp., 622 S.W.2d 80, 80 (Tex. 1981).




be calculated with reference to the price in effect for the federally man-
dated category into which the sales contract for the natural gas fell.35 In
support of its ruling the trial court cited the proposition the Texas Supreme
Court originally stated in Middleton: the legal quality of gas varies from
one category of the regulated market to another. 36 The court explained
that "rollover" and "replacement" sales could not be used to determine the
market value of this particular gas because this gas and gas subject to
"rollover" sales fall into different legal categories and, therefore, are not
comparable sales.37 The trial court refused to apply the Middleton lan-
guage that stipulated that, for purposes of determining fair market value
royalties, natural gas is to be considered as if it were "free and available
for sale."' 38 The court's reasoning was not persuasive. Rather than point-
ing out that the "free and available for sale" terminology in Middleton was
applied to intrastate gas and that it should be interpreted as meaning that
gas for purposes of royalty determinations should be free of contract price
provisions and not primary statutory classifications, the trial court in Bow-
ers simply said that it could not make an assumption contrary to the facts
before it.39
B. Implied Covenants
Parties to an oil and gas lease are able to prevent the inference of an
implied covenant by including within the lease an express provision deal-
ing with the subject matter of the implied covenant.4° A provision in the
lease incompatible with the existence of an implied covenant also prevents
the inference of an implied covenant even though it fails to expressly men-
tion its subject matter.4 ' For example, to negate an implied covenant of
reasonable development4 2 the parties to an oil and gas lease can provide a
standard for evaluating the lessee's development of the leased acreage, or
the parties can provide for delay rental payments. The payment of delay
rentals, although not expressly concerned with the development of the
leased acreage, has been held to be incongruous with an intention that an
implied covenant of reasonable development was to apply to the parties'
oil and gas lease.43
An implied covenant of reasonable development was at issue before the
Texas Supreme Court in Dallas Power & Light Co. v. Cleghorn.44 The
35. Bowers, 526 F. Supp. at 1323.
36. Id
37. Id. at 1324.
38. Id
39. Id.
40. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW §§ 826, 835.3 (1982).
41. Id. §§ 826, 835, 846.
42. For a general introduction to the implied covenant of reasonable development, see 3
W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 395-398 (1959); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 40, §§ 831-835.
43. Link v. State's Oil Corp., 229 S.W. 693, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1921, no writ).
For a general discussion of this proposition, see 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 40,
§ 835. 1.
44. 623 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1981).
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defendants in Dallas Power entered into a number of coal and lignite
leases with the plaintiffs. None of the leases before the supreme court con-
tained a primary term,45 but were to run in perpetuity as long as the lessee
continued to make timely payments of the agreed-upon delay rentals. The
parties were in the fifteenth year of the leases' term at the time the plain-
tiffs brought suit, and the defendants had begun no mining activities. The
plaintiffs claimed that an implied covenant of reasonable development
bound the defendants, and that by failing to mine the land, the defendants
breached the covenant. The plaintiffs asked the trial court to declare that
the lessees had forfeited the leases or, in the alternative, to enter a declara-
tion of forfeiture conditioned upon the lessees' failure to develop the
leased acreage within a certain time period set by the court. The defend-
ants in turn claimed that the parties had expressly provided in their leases
that the implied covenant of reasonable development was not to apply to
the lessees' operations on the leased acreage. 46 The trial court granted a
summary judgment for the defendants. The court of appeals reversed the
judgment, holding that an implied covenant existed. The supreme court
agreed with the defendants, reversed the appellate court, and held that the
lease provisions directly contradicted any implied covenant of
development. 47
The supreme court implicitly transplanted the implied covenant doc-
trines developed in the area of oil and gas leases to coal and lignite leases.
In time, this proposition may be the most significant point of the court's
Dallas Power opinion and may be the proposition for which the case is
cited. Three justices of the Texas Supreme Court, however, were not will-
ing to draw an analogy from oil and gas implied covenants to the jurispru-
dence of coal and lignite leases. 48 These justices pointed out that the
economics of coal and lignite mining require the lessee utility company to
construct the ultimate lignite consuming facility. 49 In order for the con-
struction of such a consuming facility to be feasible for a lessee, the lessee
45. Two of the leases before the court of civil appeals below had primary terms, but the
court of civil appeals disposed of both these leases to the parties' satisfaction prior to the
appeal to the supreme court. See Cleghorn v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 611 S.W.2d 893,
897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd on other grounds, 623 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.
1981).
46. In support of their claim, the defendants cited the following passages, which were
included in each of the disputed leases.
"It is understood between the parties hereto that this lease shall not be for-
feited for any failure to prosecute mining operations on the lands hereinabove
described . . . nor shall any forfeiture be claimed or enforced for the breach
of any implied covenant, but the title to the minerals in said land hereby
leased shall not revert to First Party [lessor] or his assigns so long as the an-
nual rentals as herein provided for are being paid to First Party [lessor] . ...
So long as Second Party [lessee] pays to First Party [lessor] the lease rentals
herein specified . . . Second Party [lessee] shall have, and he is hereby
granted, the exclusive right to . . . such premises . "
623 S.W.2d at 311 (emendations supplied by the supreme court).
47. Id




must be able to control an extremely large acreage of lignite-bearing lands
for a long period of time. These distinctive conditions persuaded the con-
curring justices that the implied covenants developed in oil and gas law
should not apply to coal and lignite leases and, specifically, that no implied
covenant of reasonable development should be inferred from the Dallas
Power leases.50
The concern for a lignite lessee's burden of constructing an ultimate
consuming facility for the mined lignite may also have been the reason for
the majority's denial of a distinction validly drawn by the court of civil
appeals below. The Houston [14th District] court of civil appeals noted
that the provisions in the defendants' leases5' dealt with remedies for a
breach of an implied covenant of development and not with the underly-
ing implied covenant itself.52 The lower court, therefore, held that the de-
fendants were bound by the implied covenant. 3 Nevertheless, the
supreme court found in favor of the lessees. The leases, however, expressly
addressed only one of the remedies available for a breach of an implied
covenant of reasonable development,5 4 and thus the court could have con-
strued the language merely to restrict the lessors' remedies to a suit for
damages. Such a reading would allow a lessee to retain the consolidated
block of acreage necessary for strip mining activities without fear that
those activities would be postponed by negotiations with a hold-out land-
owner who once again controlled his acreage due to a forfeiture prompted
by litigation over implied covenants.
A second curious feature of the majority's opinion in Dallas Power was
its failure to discuss the effect of the leases' express provision for the pay-
ment of delay rentals on an implied covenant of reasonable development.
An express provision for the payment of delay rentals, while the provision
is in effect, has been held to be an effective negation of an implied cove-
nant of reasonable development.5 5 This doctrine appears sufficient to de-
termine the outcome in this case. One possible reason for the supreme
court's reluctance to rely expressly on this doctrine may have been the dif-
ficulty of applying the threshhold test of an implied covenant of reasonable
development to the development of a lignite deposit. No duty under the
implied covenant of reasonable development arises until paying quantities
of minerals have been discovered on the lessor's property.5 6 In the case of
hydrocarbons this threshhold test can only be met by actual production in
paying quantities.5 7 Thus, the lessee cannot meet the threshhold test until
he drills a well. Commentators have cited this condition as a possible
50. Id
51. See supra note 46.
52. Dallas Power, 611 S.W.2d at 896.
53. Id
54. Id
55. Link v. State's Oil Corp., 229 S.W. 693, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1921, no writ).
56. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 40, § 832.1.
57. Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Dalco Oil Co., 609 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ). Production in paying quantities means production of enough of the
mineral to give the lessee some profit over operating expenses, but not necessarily a recovery
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foundation for the rule that a delay rentals clause necessarily prevents the
inference of an implied covenant of reasonable development; if delay rent-
als are being paid, no producing well has yet been drilled.58 Recently, the
Corpus Christi court of civil appeals held, however, that actual production
from the mineral acreage is not necessary to trigger the implied covenant if
the existence of a mineral in paying quantities has been demonstrated in
some other way.5 9 In order to base the Dallas Power ruling on the exist-
ence of a delay rental provision, therefore, the supreme court would have
had to have held that the existence of lignite in paying quantities can be
established only through actual production.
III. NOTICE OF UNRECORDED DOCUMENTS
In Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp. 60 the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the rule that an assignee of an interest in real
property is charged with notice of all terms of all documents in his chain of
title.61 This rule holds true whether the documents in an assignee's chain
of title are recorded or unrecorded.62 Furthermore, under the rule an as-
signee is charged with notice of all terms contained in documents refer-
enced in the documents that constitute his chain of title.63
The defendants in the case, Gulf Oil Corporation and the Superior Oil
Company, had taken assignments of interests in a lease originally given to
Mobil Oil Corporation. The Gulf and Superior interests came from Mobil
through two different chains of title. One of these chains of title came
through the plaintiff, Westland Oil Development Corporation, who had
received from its immediate assignee an area of mutual interest agreement.
This area of mutual interest agreement provided that, in the event either
party to the agreement or its assignees acquired further interests in the area
described, the acquiring party was obligated to convey a specified portion
of the newly acquired interests to the other party. Gulf and Superior had
unwittingly acquired some of their Mobil interests from an assignee of a
party to Westland's area of mutual interest agreement. On learning of
Gulf and Superior's acquisition of additional Mobil interests, Westland
brought suit to compel their conveyance of the stipulated share.
Neither the Westland area of mutual interest agreement nor the operat-
of initial drilling costs. Id; Cowden v. General Crude Oil Co., 217 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 40, § 835.1.
59. Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Dalco Oil Co., 609 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ) (presence of uranium in paying quantities ascertainable without
production).
60. 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982). The Westland Oil case covered several other points of
law that are not discussed in this Article.
61. 637 S.W.2d at 908; see also Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 250 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd); Myers v. Crenshaw, 116 S.W.2d 1125, 1130 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1938), af'd, 134 Tex. 500, 137 S.W.2d 7 (1940).
62. 637 S.W.2d at 908 (rule refers to all documents including some not usually
recorded).
63. Id; see also Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 250 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1952, writ ref'd).
1983]
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL
hmg agreement covering all the Mobil interests had been recorded. In both
chains of title, however, the original assignments from Mobil referred to
the operating agreement, which in turn made reference to the Westland
area of mutual interest agreement. The supreme court held that Gulf and
Superior were charged with notice of the Westland agreement.64
Key to the supreme court's holding was the court's view that the operat-
ing agreement was an element of the defendants' chain of title.65 The de-
fendants were therefore charged with its contents, including its reference to
the Westland area of mutual interest agreement. The court of appeals had
viewed the operating agreement as being outside the chain of title.66 The
lower court believed that the operating agreement did not affect title, and
thus framed the notice issue as a factual question of whether a reasonable
purchaser, under the circumstances, had the duty to investigate an agree-
ment referred to in an assignment. 67
Although the supreme court affirmed that an assignee is on notice of all
documents in his chain of title, it qualified the rule by suggesting that an
assignee might not be bound by the terms of an unrecorded document, a
copy of which the assignee could not obtain.68 "An entirely different result
might obtain on the issue of notice," the supreme court wrote, "if, upon
diligent inquiry and search, Gulf and Superior were simply unable to ob-
tain a copy of the operating agreement. '69 The court did not pursue this
reasoning because evidence existed that the defendants had a copy of the
operating agreement. 70 The opinion does not indicate, however, whether a
copy of the Westland area of mutual interest agreement was attached to
the defendants' copy of the operating agreement.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During the survey period the Texas Railroad Commission amended a
number of its rules and added others. The Commission's oil and gas divi-
sion amended four of its rules and added new rule 71. The division
amended rule 9 to provide standards and procedures for permit applica-
tions for saltwater and other oil and gas waste disposal wells.71 The permit
application procedures require notice of disposal well permit applications
to local governments and other interested persons and grant local govern-
ments and affected individuals the right to request a hearing on an applica-
tion.72 The director of underground injection control may also request
such a hearing on behalf of the public.73 The amendments to rule 9 also
64. 637 S.W.2d at 908.
65. See id.
66. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Westland Oil Dev. Corp., 620 S.W.2d 765, 770 (Tex. Ct. App.-El
Paso 1981).
67. Id.
68. 637 S.W.2d at 908.
69. Id.
70. Id





provide standards governing the transfer and termination of disposal well
permits, technical standards governing the physical condition of disposal
wells, and for reviews by applicants of nearby unplugged wells. 74 The oil
and gas division amended rule 31 to permit administrative suspension and
reinstatement of the allocation formula for a given gas field. 75 Under the
new rule the Commission can suspend the allocation formula for a field's
gas well allowables when all of the purchasers from the field have a market
for all of the deliverable gas from the field. The Commission may do this
only when none of the operators or purchasers from the field objects to
suspending the formula, and when suspension will not cause a pipeline
limitation for that field or for any other field. Suspension of the allocation
formula relieves the parties from the burden of filing the Commission's
form G-7.76
The oil and gas division amended rule 37 to permit administrative ap-
proval of applications for designation of oil or gas fields as salt dome
fields.77 Prior to these amendments applications could be approved only
after rulemaking proceedings had been initiated and completed.78 Certain
fields that have been classified as salt dome fields are not subject to the
requirements of rule 37, the statewide spacing rule.7 9 Amended rule 46
provides standards and procedures for permit applications for fluid injec-
tion wells.80 These amendments provide for notice and hearing as do the
amendments to rule 9, which deal with waste disposal wells. 8' Pursuant to
recently enacted provisions of the Texas Natural Resources Code, new rule
71 establishes standards and permit requirements for underground hydro-
carbon storage. 82 The function of rule 71 is to regulate the "creation, oper-
ation, maintenance, and abandonment of underground hydrocarbon
storage facilities. ' '83
The Commission's surface mining and reclamation division amended
several of its rules and added four new rules. Two of the amended rules
and all the newly added rules regulate the plugging and closure of test
holes drilled in connection with uranium ore exploration. The amend-
ments include a definition of exploration activity 84 and distinguish be-
tween overburden removal exploration and hole drilling exploration.85
The new rules govern the content of the permit that must be obtained prior
to any exploration activity, the scope of the permit, reclamation of the
drilling site, plugging, and the activity report that must be filed when ex-
74. Id.
75. Id Rule 051.02.02.031, 7 Tex. Reg. at 2062.
76. Id
77. Id. Rule 051.02.02.037, 7 Tex. Reg. at 1624.
78. Id.
79. Id., 7 Tex. Reg. at 1624-25.
80. Id Rule 051.02.02.046, 7 Tex. Reg. at 655.
81. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
82. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.201-.210 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
83. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Rule 051.02.02.71, 7 Tex. Reg. 659 (1982).
84. Id Rule 051.07.03.050, 7 Tex. Reg. at 1106.
85. Id Rule 051.07.03.200, 7 Tex. Reg. at 1625.
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ploration activities have been completed.8 6 Finally, the division adopted
amendments to the bonding and insurance sections of its coal mining
regulations. 87
In other administrative action the Texas Railroad Commission, the
Texas Department of Water Resources, and the Texas Department of
Health published a joint memorandum dealing with waste disposal. Is-
sued at the direction of the Texas Legislature, the Memorandum of Under-
standing defines the jurisdiction of the respective agencies in the areas of
oil, gas, and geothermal resource waste disposal.8 8 In addition, the agen-
cies agreed to hold annual meetings for the purpose of discussing needed
changes in the Memorandum of Understanding and encouraging commu-
nication between the agencies.89
86. Id. Rules 051.07.03.205-.208, 7 Tex. Reg. at 1625.
87. Id. Rule 051.07.05.001, 7 Tex. Reg. at 2474.
88. Id., Memorandum of Understanding, 7 Tex. Reg. at 536.
89. Id
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